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Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua
Kjell Anderson

Netherlands Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Abstract: Conventional understandings of genocide are rooted in the Holocaust model: intense mass killing
directed at the immediate destruction of the group. Yet, such conceptions do not encompass cases of so-called
slow-motion genocide, where the destruction of the group may occur over generations. The destruction of
indigenous groups often follows such a pattern. This article examines the case of West Papua with a view to
developing a new analytical model distinguishing high-intensity hot genocides, motivated by hate and the
victims’ threatening nature, with low-intensity cold genocides, rooted in victims’ supposed inferiority.
Keywords: genocide, colonialism, West Papua, Indonesia
Introduction
The boundaries of genocide are persistently contested in both jurisprudence and socio-historical
analysis. Our socio-analytical, juridical, and popular perceptions of the term genocide are shaped
by its origins in the Holocaust. The Genocide Convention arises out of this context and the more
closely mass atrocities resemble the Holocaust in form, extent, and motive the more likely they are
to be labelled genocide.
Yet many cases of genocide are atypical in the sense that they do not conform closely to these
Holocaust-based understandings of genocide. West Papua, the western half of the island of New
Guinea, may be one such case.1 The continuing influence of the Holocaust over our perceptions of
genocide contributes to a substantial blind spot in genocide—so-called slow motion genocides. Such
genocides occur incrementally, over years, or even generations. Colonial or neo-colonial genocides
targeting indigenous peoples often occur in such a manner. In these cases the physical destruction
of the indigenous people may not be directly intended; rather, the perpetrators substantially
undermine the foundations of existence for indigenous groups through systemic oppression
or wilfully reckless policies. These policies are often rooted in dehumanising constructions
of indigeneity whereby indigenous people are said to be primitive obstacles to the progress of
civilization and the collective interests of the legitimate political community.
In West Papua indigenous peoples have had their identity, autonomy, and physical security
substantially undermined through the neo-colonial policies of the Indonesian state. This systematic
campaign appears to be genocidal in that it aims at the disappearance of the (West) Papuan group,
as an autonomous political and ethnic identity; yet, it is difficult to classify as genocide due to the
survival of most Papuan individuals. Moreover, any ostensibly genocidal policies in West Papua
have indirect intent and gradual result. In this article I will explore the case of West Papua as a
means towards addressing slow-motion genocides, or cold genocides, as I have labelled them in
my analytical framework. It will situate colonial genocides within the broader phenomenon of
genocide, before analysing the case of West Papua. It will also critically assess the implications of
the West Papua case, and similar cases, for our understanding of genocide. The purpose of this
paper is not to prove or disprove the occurrence of genocide in West Papua. Rather, it utilises the
case of West Papua to illuminate the boundaries and morphologies of genocide with particular
reference to indigenous peoples. It will argue that not all genocides are high-intensity episodes
of mass killing, rather the destruction of the group can also be realized through cold genocides
characterised by gradual destruction and limited killing.
Primitivism and Progress: Colonialism and Genocide
Genocide is a relatively recent concept, yet the phenomenon encapsulated in the term is an ancient
and persistent dilemma. When Raphael Lemkin first crafted the concept of genocide in 1941,
he was undoubtedly informed by contemporaneous atrocities in Nazi-occupied Europe, yet he
saw genocide as a recurrent historical phenomenon. Moreover, his writings specifically linked
genocide and the practice of colonialism.2 Even so, colonial genocides, and neo-colonial genocides
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in particular, are far more contested in genocide scholarship than the canonical genocides of the
twentieth century such as the Holocaust, Rwandan Genocide, and Armenian Genocide.
The colonial genocide debate often centres on the means and intention of the perpetrators;
specifically, did the perpetrators act with the intent to destroy the group, and was the campaign
focused on physical destruction? Much of this debate arises from a particular interpretative lens for
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which privileges
high-intensity campaigns of killing over other more gradual genocidal approaches.
Delving into the question of intent also involves addressing broader questions of perpetrator
motivation, which situate perpetrator behaviour dichotomously in either rational instrumentality
or irrational racial hatred. Both of these schools of thought are, of course, overly reductionist.
Genocide is never fully instrumental nor fully prejudicial. Rather, motive is better assessed on the
basis of the weighing of these two paradigmatic characteristics: instrumentality (genocide arising
from the purpose of gaining or maintaining power) and prejudice/orthodoxy (genocide arising
from the perpetrators’ ideologically-based derogatory view of the victimised group). Within these
characteristics we can further disaggregate prejudicial motives into hate (a desire to destroy the
victim group on the basis of their perceived negative characteristics) and supremacy (an assumed
supremacy over the victimised population, which allows, but does not require, their destruction).
Instrumental motives for genocide are centred on the use of genocide as a tool to gain or
maintain power through the destruction of perceived threats, and also the consolidation and
concentration of power among the in-group. Yet genocide, as the deliberate destruction of a racial,
ethnic, national, or religious group, always entails a degree of prejudicial motivation. Indeed, the
targets of such destruction appear to be chosen solely on the basis of ascribed identity; in genocide
markers of identity are determinate of life and death. Prejudicial ideologies marginalize victim
groups, transforming them into valueless objects or enemies, allowing them to be destroyed.
Colonialism is characterised by a regime of foreign domination, the expropriation of land and
resources, and the imposition of foreign ideologies and belief systems. In such circumstances the
destruction of indigenous peoples is often seen as incidental and inevitable. In a sense, then, the
destruction of the victims is motivated less by hate and more by assumed supremacy.3 Supremacy
can be distinguished from hate in that in supremacy crimes the victim is not seen as an existential
threat. Once victims become a perceived existential threat, i.e. in cases where they resist the
perpetrators’ imposition of authority, perpetrator motivation may transition from supremacy to
hate. Hate crimes, unlike supremacy crimes, require the complete destruction of the offending
group – assimilation is no longer a reasonable possibility. Such destruction is deemed essential
to the survival of the perpetrator group. The victim group’s threat may be constructed in terms
of their power or their pollution. In many cases victims may be so devalued that their destruction
becomes immaterial, a functional means to an end.4
In the colonial context, resistant groups, such as the Herero in German Southwest Africa, are
no longer seen as so-called noble savages but rather a malevolent force. For example, in the official
inquiry following the German genocide of the Herero and Nama indigenous peoples in 1904, the
causes of the killing were determined to be “the arrogance of the natives and…their confidence
in their superiority over the Germans.”5 When colonial genocides are motivated by hate they are
more likely to be manifested as direct killing and easier to identify as genocide. In contrast, many
colonial genocides targeting indigenous peoples are built on notions of supremacy and utilise the
broad destructive means foreseen in Raphael Lemkin’s definition of genocide:
A coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations
of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The
objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of
culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups,
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the
individuals belonging to such groups.6

In contrast to Lemkin, I believe that the aim of colonial genocides is not always the annihilation
of the group; rather, such annihilation could be an acceptable outcome, incidental to other policy
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goals. This destruction of the group is rooted in ideologies of racial supremacy whereby civilization
and culture exist in direct opposition to biology. In fact, the closer a group is perceived to be to
living in a state of nature, the more it can be said to lack civilization. Bodies without civilization
are animal bodies. Thus, indigenous peoples, traditionally living in close connection to the natural
world, are dehumanised and placed outside of the human moral community.
Peoples conceptualized as primitive, such as the indigenous inhabitants of West Papua, are not
fully-valued but rather exist only as obstacles to progress, a half-human component of a menacing
topography. Progress in this worldview is seen as the conquest of the natural world through the
maximal exploitation of resources. Colonialism seeks to exert total power over the environment of
which indigenous peoples are a part. While some scholars have argued that the intention of colonial
regimes was (and is) the exploitation of labour and natural resources rather than the destruction
of the indigenous labour pool, this construction of colonialism ignores the desire of the colonial
regimes to possess the land in its entirety, irrespective of the local population.7 Total possession is
only possible if the indigenous inhabitants are a non-entity, either destroyed or invisible. Countercurrents of indigenous resistance may also romanticize indigenousness as a means to condemn
foreign interlopers or even to justify discrimination against non-indigenous groups (for example,
the case of Fiji and the treatment of Indo-Fijians).
The removal or destruction of indigenous peoples is often instrumental, yet still deeply rooted
in prejudicial notions privileging in-groups and denigrating out-groups. In many cases where
indigenous peoples are substantially destroyed through interaction with foreign groups, this
destruction lacks the directed nature of genocides, such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
Rather indigenous genocides bear the flavour of inevitability. The discourse goes that the
extinction of indigenous groups is an inevitable result of historical progress – like the dodo bird,
indigenous peoples suffer evolutionary unfitness: a failure to adapt and thrive in the modern
world.8 For example, British theologian Frederic Farrar, a pallbearer at Darwin’s funeral, argued
that indigenous peoples were “irreclaimable savages” predestined to “disappear from before the
face of it [earth] as surely and as perceptibly as the snow retreats before the advancing line of
sunbeams.”9 This inevitability also acts as a causal explanation for the disappearance of indigenous
peoples.10 Inevitability removes agency and neutralises the accountability of perpetrators, a pattern
of perpetrator self-justification familiar to genocide scholars. Yet the difficulty with establishing
explicit intentionality in some cases of the destruction of indigenous peoples (for example through
disease, forced displacement, or ethnocide) challenges mainstream interpretations of genocide.
Perpetration may not be intentional in the manner envisaged in the Genocide Convention, but
rather, foreseeable. Inevitability also occurs in non-colonial genocides, yet in those genocides it
arises from the power of the perpetrators and the context created by the state rather than racial
notions of inferiority.11
Indigenous groups have long been subject to racist ideologies, which characterise them
as inferior. Indeed, the assumption of all civilizing missions is that indigenous peoples are
fundamentally primitive and that only by removing the very fact of their indigenousness can
progress be achieved. Prejudicial theories also provide a ready explanation and justification for the
monopolisation of economic and political power by colonial powers.12
The key features of colonial genocides include: their foreign (extraterritorial) origin, their
strongly instrumental character (where the primary objective is the seizure of territory and
resources), and their frequent focus on the essential conditions of life of indigenous groups rather
than direct physical extermination, although such exterminatory killing also takes place in certain
cases. Indigenous groups are often characterised as being primitive and racially inferior rather than
being insidious enemies in the manner of, for example, the Tutsis of Rwanda. While colonies have
all but disappeared from the world, with notable exceptions such as French Polynesia, colonial
ideologies in the form of engrained notions of racial superiority and justifiable dominion over socalled primitive groups persist in many countries worldwide such as Indonesian West Papua.
The Case of West Papua
Since contact with Europeans, West Papua has often been seen by outsiders as a primitive and
marginal region. Under Dutch rule West Papua was a periphery of the periphery: it was marginal
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to the Dutch East Indies, which were themselves marginal in relation to the Netherlands core. This
marginality has continued under Indonesian rule, whereby West Papua is a kind of resource-rich
hinterland – an empty treasure trove for the state of Indonesia. The Papuans themselves are often
depicted as stone age – a timeless people existing outside of the inexorable march of historical
progress. This apartness of the Papuans is often either romanticised or demonised: West Papua is an
anachronistic museum piece to be preserved or destroyed in the context of modernisation.
West Papua has been inhabited by Papuan peoples for at least forty-two thousand years.13
The Papuans are Melanesians, a cultural and ethnic grouping which includes most of the people
living in the Southwest Pacific (in countries such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon
Islands, New Caledonia, and Fiji). The island is large, rugged and isolated from major population
centres; for much of their history Papuans lived in many small villages spread throughout this
vast landscape (New Guinea is the second largest island in the world). This isolation contributed
to the development of a tremendous ethno-linguistic diversity with 1,319 languages spoken in
the Melanesian region (the majority of which are on the island of New Guinea).14 Prior to foreign
domination West Papua was governed by numerous small states.15
The island was named by Spanish explorers in 1546, who thought that the inhabitants
resembled the Guineans of West Africa. The French and British also made incursions into West
Papua but the Dutch were the first to set up a presence on the island. The Dutch governed indirectly
by recognizing the sovereignty of its vassal state, the Sultanate of Tidore, over New Guinea in 1660.
The island was seen as possessing too great a challenge with too meagre material rewards for the
Dutch to directly colonize. Although the Dutch established administrative posts in West Papua
in 1898 and 1902, Dutch intervention remained minimal. Nonetheless, local resentment towards
colonial officials brought in from other parts of the Dutch East Indies grew, with some Papuans
regarding them as amberi (foreigners who talk sweet but have evil intentions); in turn Indonesians
looked upon Papuans as bodoh (ignorant).16 Royal Dutch Shell also began to develop West Papua’s
oil reserves in 1907.
When Indonesia became independent in 1949, the Dutch retained West Papua as a separate
territory, to be granted independence at a later date, on the grounds that the Papuans were a
distinct people and territory, thus not really part of the Dutch East Indies at all. The Dutch also
desired to retain West Papua as a Dutch foothold in Southeast Asia. Indonesia continued to
claim the contrary, on the grounds that all of the former Dutch East Indies constituted a single
territorial entity, to form the basis for the new state of Indonesia. This claim was rejected by some
of Indonesia’s founding fathers, notably Mohammed Hatta, on the grounds that Papuans were
racially distinct.17 Nonetheless, a propaganda campaign was initiated calling for the ‘reunification’
of West Papua with Indonesia.
Upon rejection of a proposed 1957 UN resolution recognizing Indonesian sovereignty over
West Papua, Indonesian President Sukarno seized Dutch enterprises in Indonesia and announced
the expulsion of Dutch residents.18 Four years later Papuans prepared for independence by creating
their flag, the morning star, and electing representatives to a New Guinea Council. Sukarno
responded by calling on Indonesians to liberate the territory of West Papua from Dutch rule so that
it could be reunited with the rest of Indonesia. After significant Indonesian military incursions in
1962 (defeated by the Dutch), and facing growing international pressure, the Netherlands agreed
to a staged transition of West Papua to Indonesian rule on the condition of a plebiscite on the future
of the territory. Constantin Stavropoulos, the United Nations’ legal counsel at that time, argued
that there was a strong presumption’ in favour of the self-determination of the Papuans.19
A plebiscite of sorts occurred in 1969. The referendum, dubbed the Act of Free Choice by
Indonesia and the Act Free of Choice by the Papuan independence movement, gathered 1025 tribal
leaders who ‘decided’ unanimously to join Indonesia.20 These tribal leaders were under severe
intimidation, even being threatened at gunpoint.21 Moreover, it is questionable whether this
selection of chiefs was truly representative of broader Papuan opinion.
Indonesian governance in West Papua has been characterised by this same indifference to the
views and interests of the local populace. Moreover, under Indonesian rule indigenous Papuans
have been subject to a range of systematic and widespread human rights abuses such as torture,
extrajudicial killings, forced labour, forced displacement, rape, and forced disappearance.22
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Indonesian policies have also done significant environmental damage, undermining the cultural,
political, and economic bases of Papuan society, and contributing to the prevalence of disease among
indigenous peoples in West Papua due to inadequate provision of health and sanitation facilities.23
These policies may not have been intentionally directed at the destruction of the Papuans, yet they
were undertaken with deliberate disregard for the welfare of the Papuans and knowledge of the
destructive consequences for the Papuan group.
Under Indonesian rule West Papua has seen its significant oil, mineral, and timber wealth
exploited by Indonesian and multi-national enterprises (such as Freeport McMoRan), with limited
benefits (and employment opportunities) for the local population.24 Papuans have been historically
under-represented in the oil and resource-extraction industries.25
Another manifestation of Indonesian oppression in West Papua is the severe restrictions placed
on personal liberty. These restrictions encompass arbitrary detention for months or even years at
a time, restricted movement in many regions for security reasons, restrictions on the freedom of
speech and assembly, and the requirement that people obtain a Surat Jalan (travel permit) before
traveling to their home villages.26
Indonesia has also implemented a transmigration program whereby Indonesians from
densely populated provinces (such as Java, Madura, and Bali) are given incentives to settle in less
densely populated provinces (such as Sumatra, Borneo, and West Papua). This program actually
originated with the Dutch colonial regime, but it continued and accelerated under Indonesia. It is
impossible to locate accurate official statistics on the number of transmigrants but the International
Working Group for Indigenous Affairs estimates that these transmigrants now comprise about half
of West Papua’s population of 2.7 million inhabitants.27 These transmigrants include both official
transmigrants, who are part of government programs, and spontaneous transmigrants who arrive
in West Papua through Indonesian government encouragement but not official programs.
The transmigration program is similar to the colonisation initiatives which existed in other
settler societies such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Such policies consider the land to be
terra nullius – empty or underutilized land – and aim at both the pacification of the local indigenous
population and the economic exploitation of their lands. Many of the transmigrants are retired
Indonesian soldiers moved into strategic areas such as mines and ports, as well as the Papua New
Guinea border, where the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement or OPM) guerrillas
are most active.28 Moreover, transmigrants are given many benefits not available to Papuans; this
constitutes a form of structural discrimination which limits Papuan economic opportunities.
Moreover, in many cases, the settlement of transmigrants is preceded by the forced displacement
of indigenous Papuans, who are only allowed to remain in a transmigrant area at a ratio of one
Papuan family to nine non-Papuan families.29 By 1984 approximately 700,000 hectares of land had
been confiscated, without compensation, from indigenous Papuans under the transmigration
program.30 The arrival of significant numbers of outsiders has also coincided with greatly increased
rates of disease, particularly HIV. In 2002 West Papua represented 40% of Indonesia’s total HIV and
AIDS cases with only 1% of its total population.31
Transmigration and settlement also serve the purpose of undermining the self-determination
of the local population by rendering them a minority – a distinctive disadvantage in ethnicallypolarised democratic systems. It appears that the transmigration process will continue for the
foreseeable future, until the goal of moving millions of people is reached. This serves the purpose of
helping to reduce over-population and encouraging development; however these policies have also
created conflict as indigenous peoples are swamped by outside settlers (such conflict has occurred
in all regions receiving transmigrants). The Indonesian government does not recognize indigenous
groups as being distinct in any manner; rather it considers all Indonesians to be indigenous.32
Transmigration is part and parcel of a larger project of cultural assimilation, including the
mandatory use of Indonesian as the medium of instruction in schools. This use of Indonesian has
contributed to the decline and extinction of several indigenous Papuan languages.33 Papuan beliefs,
cultural practices, and lifestyles are deemed to be primitive and in need of benign custodianship.
Progress, in this conception, is a move away from primitivism, which is itself a move away from
traditional subsistence lifestyles and towards the cash economy. For example, the so-called
Operasi Koteka (Operation Penis Gourd) in 1971-1972 sought to encourage tribes in certain New
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Guinea highland areas to abandon the Koteka and to wear modern clothing.34 Such markers of
modernisation are also a repudiation of the primitive past.
Modernisation also entails a move away from environmental sustainability (relatively ‘light’
land use such as traditional agriculture) to more intensive and less sustainable land uses such
as mining. The environmental destruction in West Papua is a direct consequence of Indonesian
development policies such as transmigration and the exploitation of natural resources.35 Although
there have been material benefits to some indigenous Papuans (such as schools being built by
mining companies), these economic activities have also displaced and alienated many indigenous
peoples from their traditional lands. Between 1982 and 1990 an average of 163,000 hectares of forest
was destroyed annually in West Papua.36 Furthermore, people living close to resource-rich areas
are often displaced, and a great deal of fertile land has been distributed to transmigrants. Papuan
resistance to these measures has been met with increasing militarisation and political oppression.
The region is currently the most heavily militarised in Indonesia with an estimated 45,000 troops
present.37
The Free Papua Movement (OPM or Organisasi Papua Merdeka) was founded in 1963 to
advocate for the autonomy of West Papua. Over time the OPM became increasingly militant,
for example, in 1977 it cut the fuel and slurry pipelines to the Freeport (Grasberg) mine. This
resulted in indiscriminate reprisal attacks from the Indonesian military that burned down entire
villages in the vicinity of the mine.38 By the 1980s violence in West Papua had escalated into a
low-intensity armed conflict, which continues to this day. As many as 100,000 people have been
killed in subsequent years, mostly civilians killed by the Indonesian State.39 Although the OPM
is well-established throughout West Papua it is lightly armed with most fighters not even having
firearms.40
Opposition to the Jakarta regime is seen by Indonesian nationalists as more than mere
difference of opinion; rather it represents a rebellion against the rationalism of modernity. As such,
indigenous resistance is a threat to the broader Indonesian nation-building project. The assertion of
ethnically-derived difference in the face of the state-building projects of newly constituted states is
a threat to the project as a whole.41 Such forms of pluralism are not acceptable in the process of state
formation, which seeks to make the nation synonymous with the state. In fact, unity is enshrined
as the second principle of the PANCASILA philosophy, found in the preamble of the Indonesian
Constitution.42 This kind of state formation, the dream of a created monolithic nationalism arising
out of diverse peoples and political units, is at the core of the dream of the nation-state. Such
nation-states (like Spain and Turkey) are truly imagined communities.43
The notion of threat is increased when one couples this ideological threat to nation-building
with the presence of an affine community in a neighbouring state (most directly the Papuans in
Papua New Guinea, but also the Melanesians in the Southwest Pacific, who have greater cultural
affinities with the Papuans than the Indonesians do). Non-conforming Papuans (i.e. those opposed
to Indonesian rule) may therefore be seen as a fifth column within Indonesia. The prior renaming
of West Papua as Irian Jaya (victorious Irian) reinforced the notion that West Papua is part and
parcel of the Indonesian national project, which is itself supposedly anti-colonial in nature.
The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 was promulgated with the intention (on the part of
Indonesian moderates) of giving West Papua a degree of autonomy.44 However, this law seems to
have made little difference on the ground. It has resulted in the Papuanisation of upper levels of
the bureaucracy but Papuans have little real autonomy.45 The Special Autonomy Law also required
the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission for West Papua, which has still not been
established.
The Indonesian military exerts a great influence over Indonesian politics and, according to
an Indonesian government official quoted in a US diplomatic cable, it operates in West Papua as
a “virtually autonomous government entity”.46 Military interests in West Papua, both as a power
base and a source of revenue have increased since the loss of East Timor and Aceh; Jim Elmslie
argues: “TNI [military] involvement in legal businesses, such as mining and logging, and illegal
businesses, such as alcohol, prostitution, extortion, wildlife smuggling, etc., provide significant
funds for the TNI as an organization and also for individual TNI members, especially senior
officers.”47
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International pressure to resolve the West Papua situation has also increased in recent years.
The violent suppression of the Papuan People’s Congress, coupled with a strike at the Grasberg
Mine in 2011, led to a statement from US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that Indonesia needed to
“address the legitimate needs of the Papuan people.”48
Genocide and West Papua
This brings us to the question as to whether the events in West Papua can accurately be
characterised as genocide. The normative weight of the term genocide undoubtedly contributes to
its overuse and abuse. Genocide, as the crime of crimes, is seen by many as a supreme validation of
victimisation; this is true even when one considers that other international crimes, such as crimes
against humanity, have grave consequences for the victims.
It is difficult to make the case that Indonesian oppression in West Papua amounts to a genocide
similar to the Holocaust or Rwandan Genocide. There is no systematic pattern of mass killing; in
fact, in gross terms, the indigenous Papuan population is actually increasing.49 One could also
argue that the Papuans are fragmented – that identity is more localised and tribal than national
and as such Papuans may not constitute a national group. Paradoxically, Indonesian oppression
in West Papua may have itself been instrumental in the formation of a national Papuan identity.50
The central elements which must be proven for any crime are the occurrence of the criminal
act(s) and the intention of the perpetrator to commit these acts. In genocide there is the additional
intent requirement of having the intention to destroy the group in whole or in part. Let us examine
each of these elements as they relate to the case of West Papua.
In West Papua there has not been any large-scale campaign of killing, rather killings have
mostly taken the form of the political repression of the independence movement (for example
by targeting those who raise the Papuan Morningstar Flag). In 2001 the US State Department’s
Country Report on Indonesia notes:
Security forces were responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting
of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbitrary detention in . . . Papua . .
. Security forces in Papua assaulted, tortured, and killed persons during search operations
for members of militant groups. The security forces inconsistently enforced a no-tolerance
policy against flying the Papuan flag, tearing down and destroying flags and flag poles, and
killing eight persons, and beating others who tried to raise or protect the flag.51

More recently, dozens of protesters were arrested on the anniversary of West Papua’s
annexation.52 Indonesian soldiers have also assassinated independence leaders on several occasions,
such as Yustinus Murib, Danny Kogoya and Theys Hiyo Eluay, although the state of Indonesia
has denied that it officially sanctioned these killings.53 Such killings could arguably constitute the
crime against humanity of persecution, but do not necessarily constitute genocide as such. It is
likely that many incidents of violence occurring in remote areas simply go unreported for fear of
reprisals. The Indonesian government has also severely restricted access into the region for foreign
journalists and human rights organisations.
There is a stronger argument to be made for Article 2 (c) of the convention – causing serious
bodily or mental harm. In his thesis Budi Hernawan argues that the widespread use of torture
functions as a mode of governance in West Papua. Effectively, the use of torture is a tool of
subjugation – illustrating in graphic form to all who see the scars of the torture victims (or who hear
of acts of torture) that Papuan bodies are not sacrosanct. Rather, bodies themselves belong to the
state. Moreover, the vulnerability of Papuan bodies also shows that Papuans may not be considered
to be full members of the political community. Indeed, the bodily and psychological persecution
of indigenous Papuans may constitute a self-evident statement as to the moral wrongfulness of
opposition to the Indonesian state and a self-admission of guilt.54
The Indonesian counter-insurgency Operation Clean Sweep of 1981 was accompanied by
the slogan Biar tikus lari kehutan, asal ayam piara dikandang (let the rats run into the jungle so that
chickens can breed in the coop), i.e. remove Papuans from areas so that they can be taken over by
transmigrants.55 This is effectively what occurred in the aftermath of the operation.56 Operation
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Clean Sweep resulted in the killing of at least 2,500 Papuans (the Indonesian government estimate),
and as many as 13,000 (an estimate given by Dutch journalists).57 Many other such massacres have
occurred through indiscriminate Indonesian attacks and collective punishment. For example, in
June and July of 1985, 517 civilians were killed in several highland villages in retaliation for an
earlier skirmish between the OPM and ABRI (Indonesian Army).58
The collective punishment of the counter-insurgency operations, when coupled with the
transmigration program and forced assimilation, could be said to constitute a sort of genocidal
project, albeit occurring over the course of decades rather than months. Demographic projections
indicate that Papuans, who represented 96.09% of the population of West Papua in 1971, will only
constitute 28.99% of the population by 2020.59 While demographic decline is not, in and of itself,
genocidal, Indonesian policies foreseeably contribute to the disappearance of the Papuans as a
politically-constituted nation; such policies and aims are consistent with Lemkin’s definition of
genocide but not the Genocide Convention.
We must also consider whether the Indonesian state, through its policies, is “deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part” (Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention). This provision was intended to cover cases of
intentional indirect killing such as famine within concentration camps. However, the conditions of
life of groups must differ depending on their particular cultural, socio-political, and environmental
context. For certain groups (i.e. those groups practicing subsistence agriculture) land is more
than monetised property – it is also an anchor for physical (food) security. Forced displacement,
environmental destruction, or even the suppression of traditional knowledge (such as techniques of
food cultivation) could dramatically decrease the physical security and sustainability of the group.
Reports have indicated, for instance, that areas subject to intensive logging may be submerged due
to soil erosion.60 The UN has also noted that current development plans in West Papua run the risk
of decreasing the food security of tens of thousands of Papuans.61 In some cases the Indonesian
government has directly destroyed the crops of Papuans.62 Such practices can certainly be harmful
to the physical and mental well-being of the group.
We can also distinguish here between voluntary and forced assimilation. In voluntary
assimilation members of the group may decide, for example, to voluntarily adopt different cultural
practices, to participate in mining or other non-traditional resource exploitation, or to adopt a
different cultural identity. In contrast, forced assimilation involves an intentional state policy
directed towards the ethnocide of the group. In practice ethnocide (cultural genocide) is difficult to
separate from physical genocide. Cultural genocide was excluded from the convention as a result of
a political bartering process. Yet, where cultural genocide is linked inextricably to physical genocide,
acts that may be characterised as cultural genocide should in fact be plainly considered genocide.
Beyond the presence of genocidal acts, the Genocide Convention requires genocidal intent (the
intent to destroy the group in whole or in part). This is difficult to prove in many circumstances yet
it can be inferred from the overall context.63 Intent may also arguably be inferred from the nature
of the criminal act itself. For example:
In 1970, soldiers patrolling the jungle border area shot and killed a pregnant woman, cut
the baby from the mother’s womb, and dissected it in front of 80 women and children of the
village. At the same time, a group of soldiers raped and killed the pregnant woman’s sister.
In 1998, in order to disrupt a pro-independence demonstration, the Indonesian navy used
force on the participants. It is alleged that women were taken out to sea on Indonesian navy
ships, where they were raped, sexually mutilated and thrown overboard. Women’s corpses
reportedly washed up on the Biak coast. Some of them showed signs of sexual mutilation;
breasts had been removed.64

Such acts of violence are indicative of genocide intent (the intent to destroy the group) as they
symbolically and literally target the means of physically sustaining the group, namely women’s
procreative functions.
Prejudicial beliefs underlie many of these policies. For example, an Indonesian textbook
discussed West Papua (Irian) in terms reminiscent of the terra nullius doctrine:
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The countryside of Irian has not yet been cultivated because of the lack of people…Civilization
is uneven…some are completely backward (in the interiors of Seram and Irian). It is clear
that the level of civilization depends on the degree of intercourse with other, advanced
ethnic groups or nations.65

Such a sentiment may be genocidal in its implications. It is not direct or public incitement to
genocide; it does not call for the extermination or destruction of the Papuans, yet it does treat
Papuans in a way that makes it clear that they have no intrinsic value or presence as human beings.
In practical fact the Papuans have little in common culturally with the rest of Indonesia. Indonesia
is a majority Muslim country while Papuans are majority Christian. For example, the centrality of
pigs in many Papuan cultures and diets reinforces Indonesian perceptions of Papuan primitivism.66
This also eases the production and perpetuation of the ‘us-them’ dichotomies necessary for
systematic persecution.
In 2007 Indonesian General Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, military commander of the Jayapura
region, threatened the brutal and indiscriminate use of force against Papuan separatists when he
told the Cenderawish Pos newspaper:
What is absolutely certain is that anyone who tends towards separatism will be crushed by
the TNI…In the interests of the Republic of Indonesia, we are not afraid of human rights. We
are quite prepared to imprison anyone, or dismiss them from their posts, whatever is in the
interest of Indonesia…If I meet anyone who has enjoyed the facilities that belong to the state,
but who still betrays the nation, I will honestly destroy him.67

Such pronouncements are indicative of the intention to destroy a group as such, one of the core
tenets of the Genocide Convention. Yet the group in question could be arguably political (opponents
of Jakarta), not ethnic. In practice, however, it is difficult to separate political identity from ethnic
identity, particularly when ethnic groups or nationalities (such as the Papuans) become politicised.
Arguably the destruction of Papuan nationalists (as a political group such a crime could constitute
the crime against humanity of persecution) would result in the near-destruction or absolute
subjugation of Papuan ethnicities. Moreover, the destruction, through violent means, of political
elites and the subsequent destruction of Papuan’s right to political self-determination and cultural
survival could set in motion the eventual physical disappearance of Papuans.
William Schabas argues that genocidal intent may include a form of recklessness, provided
that there is “virtual certainty” that an act or omission will result in the destruction of the group in
whole or in part.68 Some scholars also argue that the Genocide Convention goes beyond direct and
indirect intent (dolus directus and dolus indirectus) to also constitute recklessness (dolus eventualis).69
Reckless intent supposes that the perpetrator could foresee the possible consequences of their acts
but that they lack the direct intention to bring about those consequences. John Quigley interprets
the Genocide Convention in such a way that genocide may occur in situations where the perpetrator
acts without genocidal purpose but where genocide is a foreseeable result.70
Many genocides targeting indigenous peoples fall somewhere in the grey region between dolus
eventualis and dolus directus. The perpetrator may desire the destruction of the group, and even
hope that their acts further that objective, yet they do not act directly to bring about the destruction
of the group. In such genocides there is a kind of historical intentionality, rather than an immediate
intentionality. This historical intentionality sees the destruction of the group as inevitable in the
long term; it results in a set of policies which further this result in an incremental fashion. These
policies may include, for example:
1. Destruction of cultural sustainability
2. Destruction of economic sustainability
3. Destruction of political sustainability
As genocide is primarily concerned with the protection of identity groups (nations, ethnicities,
religions, and races), the destruction of a group’s essential life foundations (such as the ability
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of group members to practice their culture, pass on traditional knowledge, feed themselves, and
govern themselves) is pursuant to an intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.
There is a fundamental normative flaw in the law’s construction of genocide: the assumption
that cultural practices are not essential to physical survival. This assumption is grounded in a
European, civilizing worldview which sees culture as being in direct opposition to corporeal needs
and realities. In such conceptions culture is a matter of survival only in the sense that culture is
connected to rationalism, thus the technological foundations of modern life. In many indigenous
societies culture is intimately connected to traditional knowledge. Such knowledge is not just
a matter of ritual and rite but also of survival in the physical world. As indigenous groups are
separated from their connection to the physical world they are also separated from their primary
means of security and survival. In other words, cultural genocide can also constitute a means
of physical genocide. The alienation of indigenous groups, such as Papuans, from their culture
may be a direct threat to their physical survival. The forced removal of indigenous peoples from
their means of both food and cultural production is a direct threat to their physical survival. In
West Papua the reduction of land available to indigenous Papuans, through the settlement of
transmigrants and other forms of economic development, have resulted in a reduction in the
lands necessary for indigenous Papuans to practice shifting cultivation – their traditional means
of subsistence.71
In many contexts direct killing may not be necessary to effectuate genocide. The Genocide
Convention already recognizes this through its inclusion of such acts as the forcible transfer of
children from one group to another group and the prevention of births. It is reasonable to consider
that the scope of the convention can be interpreted so as to cover forms of cultural genocide, which
are directed at the destruction of the group, or other policies which may lack direct intent but
that will foreseeably lead to the destruction of the group. The intentionality of such acts can be
inferred from the context and the perpetrating group’s view of the victim group.72 In situations
where prejudicial ideologies and views are prevalent and the perpetrator acts, with knowledge,
in complete disregard for the negative consequences of their acts on the victim group, then the
perpetrator possesses an intent to destroy.
How can we distinguish the intent to destroy from mere oppression? In colonial and
neocolonial contexts the perpetrator group harbours the intention not only to dominate the victim
group but to possess their living space in its entirety, irrespective of their reduced prospects for
continuity and survival. Such groups consider their presence in a territory to be more worthy by
virtue of their advanced civilization or enlightened ideology. Under the ideology John Docker
calls supersessionism groups may even consider themselves to be history’s true heirs, with the
implication that other, less worthy groups are inevitably bound to die off.73 Groups holding such
ideological constructions may inculcate a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby they undermine the
fundamental survival basis of groups deemed to be inferior; when these groups fail it is taken as
proof of the inevitability of their disappearance. Structural forms of violence, such as the Indian
great famine of 1899-1890, are only possible through the complete disregard shown to the lives of
colonial subjects. We should also recall as well that omissions may be genocidal.74
There seems to be misperception among many scholars that the Genocide Convention
contains a motive requirement. In particular they point to the phrase as such in article 2 of the
convention (the intent to destroy the group as such).75 The Jelisic Appeals chamber judgement at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) discarded the notion, posited
by the Trial Chamber in the same case, that hatred must be a motive in genocide.76 The Appeals
Chamber found:
The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain
personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of
a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to
commit genocide.77

Thus, instrumental genocides are also encompassed by the convention. The West Papua case,
where crimes are often committed pursuant to economic goals, could be one such case.
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Even if the Indonesian state could be shown to be acting with intentionality or careless
disregard, towards the welfare of Papuans, do the acts of the state of Indonesia amount to genocide?
The Indonesian government disputes any genocidal intent; rather, it argues that its actions in West
Papua have been directed at the suppression of a violent terrorist movement and the achievement
of economic development.78 While there have assuredly been widespread killings and other acts of
violence these still seem too sporadic to constitute a deliberate policy of annihilation. The Genocide
Convention, of course, goes beyond mere killing to include acts such as the forcible transfer of
children. One could argue that the inclusion of such acts goes beyond biological destructiveness to
encompass cultural destruction.
It might be the case that the Indonesians desire the destruction of the Papuans as a political
and cultural community. Such destruction may not be directed towards the physical destruction
of the members of the group, yet it undoubtedly targets the social relations and cultural
knowledge necessary for the group’s survival in the long term.79 Like many indigenous peoples
facing persecution in the name of progress, Papuan existence may be contingent on the absolute
disappearance of separate Papuan political and cultural identity. In short, Indonesian policies may
lack intentionality and urgency yet they do have genocidal implications in that they attack the
sustainability of the group. How can genocide studies relate to such cases?
Reassessing Genocide: Hot and Cold Genocides
The lack of adequate engagement of policy-makers and theorists with colonial and neo-colonial
slow-motion genocides is also a failure to engage with structural violence – violence in which a social
structure prevents people from meeting their basic needs.80 There are several explanations for this
analytical deficiency. Firstly, the concept of genocide largely arose from the historical context of the
Holocaust. As such, there is a tendency among genocide scholars to ignore genocides which do not
fit the Holocaust model of mass killing in pursuit of a racist ideology.
Secondly, structural violence is often more subtle than mass killing. It entails undermining
the conditions of life for targeted groups gradually, over years or even decades. Such genocides
pose significant problems in terms of proof of criminal intentionality; in the absence of explicit
statements of genocidal intent, structural violence requires a thorough understanding of complex
socio-economic structures and policies.
Finally, there is the possibility that genocide studies suffer from colonial biases. The great
majority of genocide scholars are located in the Global North. Thus, in some sense, the privilege of
many genocide scholars is built upon a foundation of past structural violence against indigenous
and other subject peoples. We must ask whether genocide studies itself has the effect of merely
reproducing, rather than challenging, existing power structures?
There is a need for a new analytical framework for genocide in order to account for cases,
such as West Papua, where the disappearance of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group is
gradual and incidental, rather than rapid and intentional. Such cases are still genocidal in the sense
that the perpetrating group knowingly performs acts that contribute to the eventual destruction
of a group.
With this in mind it may be useful to conceptually distinguish between hot genocides and
cold genocides.81 When we speak of temperature in this context we mean emotional passion and
intensity of action. The concept of hot and cold war made a similar, but not identical, distinction
between direct and indirect violence.82 The very notion of genocide contains a popular perception
of racial hatred, and the desire to annihilate, notions which are undoubtedly intense. Yet, by
maintaining such a narrow view of genocide we are blinding ourselves to alternative means for the
destruction of groups.
We can distinguish between hot and cold genocides on the basis of the following factors:
emotion, (perpetrator) perceptions of the victim, the intention of the perpetrator, the speed at
which genocide occurs, the tools utilised, and the primacy of instrumental motivations.
Firstly, hot genocides are characterised by the passion/hatred of the perpetrator towards the
victim group. This hatred is rooted in a sense of existential threat projected onto the victims. The
victims are often seen as devious, sources of contamination, or evil. Hatred towards the victims is
a source of inspiration and authorisation for genocidal killing. This hatred towards the victims is
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consistent with Sternberg and
Characteristic
Hot Genocide
Cold Genocide
Sternbergs’
Story-Based
Theory of Hate which
defines hatred as having
1. Emotion
Hate
Supremacy
three characteristics: the
negation
of
intimacy,
2. Victim
Threatening
Contemptible
commitment, and passion.83
In
contrast,
cold
Disappearance through
genocides
may
be
3. Intention
destruction or complete
Annihilation (direct)
passionless. They are not
(dolus specialis)
subjugation (indirect,
motivated by hate but by
eventual)
the perpetrators’ assumed
Fast (urgent,
Slow (inevitable, sustained,
4. Speed
supremacy over the victims.
high-intensity)
low-intensity)
In the Holocaust, Jews
5. Tools
Killing, assaults,
Structural violence,
were not merely seen as
(actus
reus)
concentration
camps
biological
genocide
inferior but rather as “an
aspect of the environment
6. Instrumentality
Background
Foreground
that had to be removed”;
they were targeted not
because of the supposedly Table 1. Hot versus Cold Genocides.
disproportionate
wealth
that they possessed, but rather because they represented a mortal danger to the “Aryan race.”84
Although in both cases the perpetrators are prejudiced towards the victims, in the case of cold
genocides this prejudice may be manifested as pity, indifference, or annoyance rather than passion
(anger/hate).
In cases where the victim group is seen as threatening, physical violence is more likely to be
utilised. Perhaps this threat hypothesis can explain the relatively higher levels of violence utilised
by the Indonesian state in East Timor (estimates place war-related deaths at up to a quarter of the
population), in comparison to West Papua.85 In West Papua anti-regime activity has been relatively
limited and sporadic.
Secondly, hot genocides rely heavily on killing and other direct acts of destruction such as
harming the victim group or intentionally starving them in concentration camps. In contrast, cold
genocides undermine the conditions of life of the victim group or destroy them through gradual
policies such as the transfer of children from the victim group to the perpetrator’s groups. The
destruction of the victims’ culture, alienation and forced displacement from traditional lands,
demographic dilution, and environmental destruction may also gradually contribute to the
disappearance of the group.
Thirdly, the perpetrators in hot genocides intend to destroy the victim group completely.
By contrast in cold genocides the destruction of the victim group may be accomplished through
its gradual disappearance. Disappearance can be affected through the extreme marginalisation or
subjugation of the victim group, or its complete cultural assimilation. In one sense, this act of
subjugation is more closely aligned to the crime against humanity of persecution than the crime of
genocide, yet it is genocidal in that it still seeks (or foreshadows) the eventual disappearance of the
victim group. Such destruction goes beyond normal acts of persecution.
Fourthly, in hot genocides the destruction of the targeted group takes place in a manner of
a few years (such as occurred in The Holocaust) or months (such as occurred in Armenia and
Rwanda). The victim groups’ perceived threatening nature towards the perpetrators necessitates
their urgent destruction. In contrast, in cold genocides the destruction of the victim group is seen
as inevitable rather than imperative. Such destruction is more a matter of evolution, of social
Darwinism, rather than deliberate acts. We can also draw a parallel here with low-intensity armed
conflicts, which, although relatively limited in mortality, still indicate the presence of sustained
conflict.
Finally, in hot genocides instrumental motives, such as the maintenance of power, are often
secondary to racial motives. Contrarily, in cold genocides instrumentality, such as the seizure
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of natural resources, is often a primary motivation. However, we must reiterate the complexity
of motive, and, consequently, that in both hot and cold genocides instrumental and prejudicial
motives are present. Moreover, the motives of individual perpetrators may be instrumental (i.e. the
theft of a neighbour’s property) even while group motives remain prejudicial.
Genocide can shift from cold to hot in cases where victims resist, thus their perceived threat
to perpetrators increases. This transition may be only temporary (isolated suppressive massacres)
or it may result in a policy shift towards more intensive killing. Such a pattern characterised the
mass killings occurring in Ntega and Marangara communes in northern Burundi in 1988 where a
minor episode of Hutu violence was met by a massively disproportionate response from the Tutsidominated army.86 Colonial genocides are often cold, as the perpetrators view indigenous peoples
as being primitive, non-entities rather than an existential threat to the survival of the perpetrator
group. This certainly seems to be the case in West Papua where indigenous Papuans are viewed as
mere obstacles to development.
The case of Tibet is an informative example of another (neo) colonial cold genocide. In Tibet
under Chinese occupation there seems to have been no directly intentional policy of extermination,
and yet Chinese policies in Tibet have recklessly and callously contributed to the deaths of well
over a million Tibetans.87 From 1950 to 1959 Tibet experienced a grinding famine which killed more
than a million people.88 Moreover, over 6000 monasteries and religious (Buddhist) buildings were
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution in a campaign of cultural genocide, often accompanied
by acts of brutality and violence.89 In the years after the Dalai Lama fled Tibet a further 73,200
Tibetans died in prison and forced labor camps and more than 150,000 Tibetans were executed.90
Furthermore Chinese policies have restricted births among ethnic Tibetans and brought millions
of non-Tibetan migrants into Tibet.91 All of these processes have been driven by the paternalistic
characterisation of Tibetans as feudal peoples (primitives) in need of upliftment, in the form of Han
Chinese culture and Communist ideology.
In some sense the genocide of Tibetans in China has actually moved from a hot phase,
characterised by direct killings and violence, to a cold one, characterised by policies seeking to
forcibly assimilate Tibetans. Perhaps the Cultural Revolution already did enough damage to the
basis of Tibetan culture (such as the 90% reduction in the numbers of Buddhist monks) that hot
genocide is no longer necessary, rather the Tibetans will slowly disappear in the face of ongoing
cultural pressures.
Critics of this typology might question why it is even necessary to gather cases which are
questionable under the intentionality requirements of the Genocide Convention. Rather than
seeking to exclude genuine victims of genocide, they are concerned that expanding notions of
genocide only serves to water down the notion of genocide until it has no legal, explanatory,
or normative power. However, one could also argue that the development of the notion of
cold’genocide provides an explanatory framework for other cases of genocide where genocidal
destruction is still intentional, but indirect. Paradoxically, in cases of cold genocide individuals
may not be physically exterminated, even while the group is gradually destroyed. This gradual
and intended destruction of the group is certainly genocidal in nature, even if it might not conform
to existing notions of genocidal intent in the Genocide Convention.
Conclusion
There are several fictions embedded in the legal definition of genocide. Foremost among these is
the notion that the destruction of a group only occurs through acts such as killing and biological
genocide. In fact, the cultural and political destruction of a group, when coupled with the violent
suppression of cultural and political identity, is pursuant to the destruction of the group. This
is particularly true when the group in question is an indigenous group, where identity is often
centred on kinship and the relationship to the land. The denial of the right to self-determination is
a denial of the right to exist. Moreover, the pervasive surveillance and harassment that characterise
authoritarian states may dissolve the bonds of trust that sustain kinship and clan relations.92
Even without expanding the definition of genocide under the convention, interpretations of
genocide must be critically reconsidered so as to encompass cases of cold genocide. While many
of the acts involved in low-intensity, cold genocides are already prohibited under an array of
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human rights instruments, these instruments fail to capture the pernicious harm involved in the
destruction of an ethnicity.
Indonesia’s national motto is unity in diversity yet there has been far too much emphasis on
unity as a cultural, economic, and political hegemonic project and not enough recognition of
ethnic diversity. This has resulted in numerous minor and major ethnic conflicts and secessionist
movements including, for example, West Papua, Aceh, the Molucca Islands, East Timor, and
indigenous-settler conflicts among the Dyaks in Borneo. It has also led to systematic atrocities
targeting political opponents of the State (such as occurred in East Timor from 1975-1999, as well
as throughout Indonesia in the anti-Communist killings of 1965-1966).
Indonesia’s oppression of Papuans may be rooted in supremacist perceptions towards peoples
called primitive rather than hatred, but this oppression still represents a deliberate attack on the
sustainability of the group. Effectively Papuans “do not regard themselves as Indonesians and
are not regarded as such by other Indonesians.”3 How then can such a group survive within a
militarised, hegemonic state?
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